1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3 14-CR-00476 (ILG) 4 5 -against-United States Courthouse 6 Brooklyn, New York 7 ROBERT BANDFIELD, GREGG 8 MULHOLLAND, Friday, January 22, 2016 9 DEFENDANTS. 10:00 a.m. 10 11 TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR MOTION HEARING 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE I. LEO GLASSER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 APPEARANCES: 14 For the Government: ROBERT L. CAPERS, ESQ. 15 United States Attorney BY: JACQUELYN M. KASULIS, ESQ. 16 WINSTON M. PAES, ESQ. MICHAEL T. KEILTY, ESQ. 17 Assistant United States Attorneys 18 For the Defendant ROBERT BANDFIELD: BY: **EUGENE INGOGLIA**, **ESQ**. 19 SAVANNAH STEVENSON, ESQ. 20 For the Defendant GREGG MULHOLLAND: BY: JAMES KASOURAS, ESQ. 21 EDWARD V. SAPONE, ESQ. 22 Court Reporter: Angela Grant, RPR, CRR Official Court Reporter 23 24 Proceedings recorded by computerized stenography. Transcript 25 produced by Computer-aided Transcription.

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1	(In open court.)
2	(Time Noted: 10:00 a.m.)
3	(Defendants present in open court.)
4	COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal cause for motion. The
5	United States versus Robert Bandfield and Gregg Mulholland.
6	Counsel, please state your appearances for the
7	record.
8	MS. KASULIS: Jacquelyn Kasulis, Winston Paes and
9	Michael Keilty for the government.
10	Good morning, Your Honor.
11	MR. INGOGLIA: Good morning, Judge. Gene Ingoglia
12	and Savannah Stevenson, my colleague, from Morvillo, LLP for
13	Mr. Bandfield.
14	Good morning.
15	THE COURT: Good morning.
16	MR. KASOURAS: Good morning, sir. James Kasouras,
17	Edward Sapone and Chase Ruddy for Gregory Mulholland.
18	THE COURT: Good morning.
19	We have quite a series of motions before me.
20	There are a number which are, in effect, jointly made. And
21	there are some which are made by Mr. Mulholland and some
22	which are made individually by Mr. Bandfield.
23	Why don't we address the joint requests first. I
24	don't know how you want to proceed with respect to that.
25	MR. KASOURAS: Judge, Mr. Ingoglia and I have

PROCEEDINGS discussed this and instead of both arguing the same motion 1 2 we're each going to pick one that we make jointly and then 3 we can separately address our separate motions. 4 THE COURT: All right. Now, there are quite a few that were made jointly. Am I correct in understanding that 5 6 you're going to address those, Mr. Ingoglia? 7 MR. INGOGLIA: Yes, Judge. 8 THE COURT: All right. Fine. So why don't we 9 start with the motion to suppress the evidence that was 10 seized from the corporate offices in Belize. That's a 11 motion which both of you have made. 12 MR. KASOURAS: Yes, Judge. 13 MR. INGOGLIA: Correct, Judge. 14 And as a matter of housekeeping before I start, 15 yesterday we filed an affidavit. It was not a reply. 16 didn't argue, but we attached a supplemental exhibit which 17 was --18 THE COURT: That was Exhibit H. 19 MR. INGOGLIA: Correct. I just wanted to make 20 sure Your Honor had received it. 21 THE COURT: I did receive it, and I'm looking 22 forward to having it all interpreted for me.

MR. INGOGLIA: I think we all are.

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The only other sort of housekeeping item is the Supreme Court in Belize has apparently issued a decision in

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a lawsuit that was filed by Titan, which is one of the entities that's at issue in the case and that was searched pursuant to what we're calling the Belize searches in this case. And the subject of that lawsuit by Titan against the government in Belize was the legality of the search. And, apparently, the Supreme Court of Belize has ruled in favor of Titan.

We are trying to get some kind of certified copy of the opinion so that we can provide it to you, but I wanted you to be aware. I know the government is aware that that had happened after the time that the government had filed its response.

THE COURT: This motion that was made by Titan, was that predicated upon a search warrant issued by the Belize law enforcement authorities?

MR. INGOGLIA: It was predicated --

THE COURT: Let me rephrase it.

What was the basis of the motion to suppress?

Maybe that will get you.

MR. INGOGLIA: They were challenging, and, again, I'm not familiar enough with the opinion to give you the details, but they were challenging the searches that are at issue in this case.

THE COURT: On what basis?

MR. INGOGLIA: On the constitutionality of them

under the Belize constitution.

There may have been more aspects than just the constitutionality, but the constitutionality was one of the challenges.

THE COURT: Well, the reason I ask is I would suspect that the legal analysis would be probably similar to the analysis which underlies at least the government's analysis of it, underlies the motion to suppress the Belize search. Insofar as it was based upon law enforcement activity by the Belize law enforcement persons or search warrants issued by Belize, I understand the government's position is that's not implicated or wouldn't effect the validity of the admissibility of the evidence.

MR. INGOGLIA: I think that's right. I think their position, well, is that it's irrelevant, and our position is it's not dispositive, but it's relevant that a Belize court has said it's illegal.

We'll get you that opinion as soon as I can get it, a comfortable copy of it for you.

THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry to --

MR. INGOGLIA: So I'd like to quickly summarize sort of the gist or the heart of our argument. This is the Rule 16 challenge.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. INGOGLIA: At its core it's a simple argument

is we can't assess whether or not the searches in Belize pass muster without access to documents that show how they were conducted, under what authority they were conducted and, importantly, what the degree of U.S. involvement and control was.

Relatedly, and this is not an issue that we flagged in our motion, but, relatedly, we can't challenge at trial the admissibility and the weight of evidence that was seized from these four corporate offices, but as you saw in the papers, not, not itemized. So we would normally, if this had been a search in the U.S., we would -- and they searched four offices and lumped everything together and you couldn't tell which came from IPC and which came from Titan and which came from Unicorn, we would have arguments about their admissibility, we would have arguments, even if they were admissible, as to the weight the jury should give them given that their providence is uncertain.

So those arguments that we would have at trial that are impeded by not having access to the documents. So that's the heart of our Rule 16 argument and why it's, in essence, why it's material to us.

THE COURT: Now, before you go any further, I think what makes sense to have the government address each of these individual motions. So when you're finished with that Rule 16 motion, we'll let the government respond to it.

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MR. INGOGLIA: Fair enough. That seems fair.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. INGOGLIA: And then, look, the heart of our argument here is it's inequitable, profoundly inequitable, for the government to use the fruits of the search, which it has received from Belize, and decline to even try to get the documents underlying the search. And when I say decline to try to get, what I mean is not that the U.S. Attorney's Office hasn't conferred with the Office of International Affairs. They apparently have discussed the issue with the Office of International Affairs.

But jointly or based on those conferring discussions, apparently the U.S. Attorney's Office has decided they don't need to or don't want to ask Belize for the underlying documents, and we think those two things together, using the fruits, but deliberately choosing not to even try to get the documents that underline the search that are in Belize is profoundly inequity. That's what's animating everything I'm going to talk about.

THE COURT: Just let me ask, these documents that are underlying the search, I take it you're referring to documents which authorized the search.

MR. INGOGLIA: I'm -- I'm talking about those -- those are among the documents I'm talking about. I mean, I think -- so the MLAT application is what initiated the

search. Presumably, a warrant was issued, that's what, under Belizean law, authorized the search.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. INGOGLIA: And governed what the terms would have to be.

Because the ultimate legal issue about whether this search passes muster, whether Your Honor is going to exclude it or not, apply the exclusionary rule or not, turns on the degree of U.S. involvement and whether they exercise control. Any documents that evidence that are part of what we're seeking under the Rule 16. So it's not just simply those two documents. It's not simply just the application and just the warrant.

THE COURT: Well, before I get to the government's response, if the government's argument is that the documents that your request -- is not under their control, they don't have possession of it, that's what they say. Or if the government's argument is that the documents which have authorized the search are documents which were generated by the authorities in Belize, and that's foreign law, which the validity of which or the extent of which or the implication of which doesn't implicate the exclusionary, my question is, do we need a hearing to determine or do I take it on faith that the government says we don't have it? And the government says that the documents are documents with which

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we had nothing to do, we didn't execute any warrants, they weren't ours and, more importantly, I suppose those would be relatively easy to resolve amongst you.

MR. INGOGLIA: I think that's probably right. I think --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Excuse me. I just -- the last part of that, which I think is probably as important as the other two, is the government's position, as I understand it, that there's no agency relationship between the government and the law enforcement authorities in Belize, that we were not their partners, we weren't there, we weren't in the offices in Belize when the search was conducted, we didn't authorize it. That was all done by Belize.

Now, does that require a hearing or do we accept -- assume that if the government issues a memorandum which says that's the fact, I believe it?

MR. INGOGLIA: On the last point, the question of whether there is an agency relationship is a fact-based analysis. And the facts that would help us determine whether that assertion is accurate are the documents I'm trying to get in my Rule 16 application. So I think -- I certainly think that just the fact that in their response brief they have asserted that the record shows certain things, when there's no documentary evidence of any of it,

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by itself isn't enough. What it would take to be enough to try to establish some of those things, you know, obviously, we're seeking the actual underlying documents, but there may be that some aspects of those that could be done short of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. INGOGLIA: So -- wave at me at the end and I promise I'll add. How about that.

So I think they're making two arguments. They're making the first argument is what we're seeking is not material, and I think that's the weaker of their two I think the basis for a search is sort of arguments. classically material to a defense. I think I previewed why I think it's important. We need to evaluate whether the search passes muster, whether it meets -- the standards are does it shock the judicial conscience, right? And we're not arguing that it does. We didn't see any facts that suggests. Even on our limited access to the facts, we're not aware of any fact that suggests it rises to that level. It shocks the conscience of my client the way it was conducted, but in terms of the case law, we're not arguing But in terms of was there U.S. control or significant involvement that is indicative of U.S. control, I think that's a fair question.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. INGOGLIA: And that's what we're getting at.

And then my point about trial. I think if we were going to challenge -- if they get -- if they prevail and they're able to use this evidence that was taken apparently without an inventory ever being conducted by the Belizeans when they moved everything from the offices to some unknown location for the agents to come down and sift through, when they did that, apparently they didn't do an inventory and it's four different offices. Not all of them are associated with my client. IPC is my client's office. So if they're going to use evidence that they seized sort of in blunderbuss fashion and they can't document where it came from, that's another reason why we think the underlying documents are material. So I don't think -- I don't think that's a close call, but -- and I'm happy to answer questions about it, but I think the documents, notwithstanding their assertions, are material.

They make one specific argument about the MLAT application itself and there's case law that suggests that because a defense can challenge the treaty itself, the MLAT application doesn't have to be produced because the defendant doesn't have standing to challenge the treaty.

But we're not seeking to challenge the treaty.

What we're trying to assess is the degree of U.S. involvement, and a piece of that story is the MLAT

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application that prompted the search. And we know now for the first time from the government's response that there are details in that application that are factually significant. The government asked that the search be done in an expedited fashion and it was.

If I'm not dating myself too much, there's an old Looney Tunes cartoon with the bulldog and his little terrier friend, and the terrier would scamper around the bulldog and say, "What are we doing today? What are we doing today, boss?" And the bulldog would sort of slap him on the back of his hand.

Well, that's the relationship between the U.S. and Belize. The U.S. is the bulldog and Belize is the terrier. And when the U.S. said can you please do this search on an expedited basis -- I'm sure it was a polite request -- they sort of sprinted out and they took -- they went to the offices with a small, you know, an army of people and gathered whoever they could and drove over in U.S. decaled vehicles that there's some factual dispute about and took everything out of the office, wholesale, including the copiers, which only we think is significant, and just relocated the contents of the office, wholesale, to some other location. And then they invited the U.S. to come down and take a couple weeks to go through. And to us, you know, putting aside the sort of narrow point that that expedited

request aspect is important and it shows why the MLAT is a Rule 16 appropriate in this case.

THE COURT: As I understand the government's view, they say that the MLAT material is confidential.

MR. INGOGLIA: Yeah, I think --

THE COURT: And with respect to the bulldog terrier analysis, if my memory serves me, I think the people in Belize just ignore the request that the government was making to turn the material over. They said we're not going to give it to you.

MR. INGOGLIA: But they didn't, right? Under the treaty --

THE COURT: Well, they eventually did.

MR. INGOGLIA: Well, they searched it in an expedited way.

And what the government says is we asked that agents be present at the time. And Belize didn't respond. But what Belize did is they took everything out of the offices, moved it to a different location and said, come on down and you search it. Because, remember, what the Belize officials did, they didn't search, they just took. They seized the entire consents of the office. You know who searched, the U.S. agents. The U.S. agents came down, they searched the contents of the office.

So all of which is to say, I've gotten ahead of

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myself, but the fact that in some cases the MLAT application has not been deemed to be Rule 16 material, I don't think -- I think in this case we get a slightly different posture and it matters that they asked for expedited review and U.S. involvement.

There are -- so that's materiality. And there are some documents that I think are -- have to be in the U.S. government's possession that we haven't seen on the subject. And I guess it's because they don't view them as material, but the FBI never does anything without copiously documenting it. I haven't seen any FBI documents about their involvement in the search. We haven't seen any documents about communications between U.S. officials and Belize officials about the search.

So I'm not talking about documents that are in Jackie Kasulis' possession, but in the U.S. government's possession related to this investigation, there has to be documents about the search, about communications back and forth that's in their possession. They don't really address this in their papers directly, but I don't know why that wouldn't be. You know, the possession, custody or control isn't in dispute I don't think on those issues. I don't know why we don't have those.

With respect to -- so that's -- I can go on and on, right. But let me go to the documents that are in

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Belize. And because that's the other question, right, does the U.S. really have possession, custody or control of those? And our argument is that the U.S. -- the big dog does have control here; that -- and the way to test it is for the government to ask, for the U.S. government to ask Belize for the documents. And then we would know within, you know, maybe 15 minutes whether Belize would say, oh, you're offending me by trying to expand the treaty or Belize would say here they are.

The idea that the treaty is -- has aspects that envision certain documents to be confidential or that the treaty was only drafted with an eye toward the government's Brady disclosures and not to its larger discovery obligations, I don't know whether that's true or not. I'm not a student of the treaty, but it's not our problem. It's their problem. They investigate the way they choose to There's no MLAT exception to their Rule 16 investigate. obligation. I read it again. It doesn't say unless OIA says they have concerns that maybe it will upset the Belizeans, then you don't have to ask. There's nothing in there about that.

So that is interesting. It's a problem for them, I understand. I'm not -- it is true that the United States wants to maintain relationships with countries and they enter treaties for that purpose. But that doesn't dictate

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what Rule 16 requires. And that's what the government is arguing, they're saying, well, Rule 16 must not provide for this because the treaty doesn't. And that's backwards. The rights that are at issue here are the rights of my client in this courtroom being tried criminally by this office. And that's, that's -- Rule 16 is implicated there.

Lots of governments -- the U.S. Attorney's Office makes tactical decisions about where it goes and how it collects evidence all the time, and you're stuck in the bed that you make. And if you gather a bunch of evidence abroad, you know, there are limitations on that and there are consequences to it. And it might be that you can't use it as much as you want, but their obligations are the same. So I don't think it's a fair response to say either the treaty is, you know, is restrictive or to say OIA, the Office of International Affairs, has told us that they have concerns.

I was a prosecutor for nine years. OIA never says yes the first 12 times you ask for anything, and it's because their interests are different than -- and I'm sure they will agree with me about this -- than what a criminal defendant's interests are, what the Court's interests are and even what the prosecutor's interests are. They're not interested in that. They're interested in not just maintaining a relationship between the U.S. and Belize, but

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they're interested in maintaining their individual personal relationship with whatever their counterpart is on the other side, and I don't want to annoy that person, or whatever it is.

And so frequently it is the case that the U.S.

Attorney's Office has to go all the way up the chain at OIA asking again and again and again. I've got a prosecution here. I need this for my prosecution. And that dialog happens all the time. And it is not the case that, and it shouldn't be the case, that an OIA functionary determines the degree of production we get on these documents when they're so material to our defense.

I think we disagree about the import of a couple cases. Castroneves we think is instructive here. It's not binding. It's the Southern District of Florida, but it's instructive. It's persuasive I think on its face. And the district court there ordered the production of the MLAT application, the supporting affidavit that went with it and Brazilian documents that were produced in response. And that was because the Court determined that was the only way the defendant could evaluate the assertion by the U.S. Attorney's Office that they had tolled the statute of limitations, right. And so the government's response, well, this is not a statute of limitations case. You're right, it isn't, but the analysis is exactly the same.

The parties are in a position where the person with the access to the documents is the government, and the defense doesn't have an ability to test it without access to the documents. And so in that case I don't know whether the government made the argument that, you know, it's going to offend the treaty with Brazil in some way, but the court ordered what was to be produced. It didn't order, by the way, how it was to be produced. It would not be our suggestion that Your Honor make this very specific order that they sort of throw up I think as a straw man that that might cause problems with the executive powers or some such.

All -- look, we're asking that -- our argument is the ship has already sailed. Mr. Bandfield has been here a year and a half. The time for them to have decided all this and made these inquiries has long past, and you should just suppress this and they can proceed to trial on their other overwhelming evidence which includes videotape of our client and all the other things that they think is overwhelming.

That's our argument, right, but you could order them to produce certain materials and they can figure out how they get it in a way that doesn't contravene the treaty. Respectfully, that's their obligation. They're the government. We're the defense.

The fact that there may be a letters rogatory opportunity, that's equally available to both sides. It's

the government's obligation, let them file the letters of rogatory to get the documents that they're obligated to give us as part of their discovery obligation.

We also seem to disagree on Gomez Castrillon. And I just want to point out on that, I realize I'm in the weeds here, but in Gomez Castrillon the government says well -- they point to the Court's description of the defendant's motion as a doomed motion. But the reason that it was a doomed motion in that case was the defendant's in that case were not U.S. citizens. But Mr. Bandfield is a U.S. citizen so the analysis is completely different. But the overall reasoning of Gomez Castrillon supports our argument, right.

I think that I have spoken too fast, but I suppose the last thing I want to say is -- I'm sure that I'll take that back and I'll have more to say -- but at least at the moment the last thing I want to say is the government keeps saying that we're relying on conjecture upon conjecture about what the events were as they happened in Belize. And it takes a lot of moxie, and, apparently, they have it to make that argument when the reason we don't know what happened in Belize is because they won't ask Belize for those documents. And it's -- it just can't be. It can't be and it shouldn't be that the government can use the fruits of the search, which it happily accepts from Belize, but not even try to get the documents in Belize that show whether or

not that search was done properly.

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It's true that some of the individual facts that we offered in support of our motion by themselves are not enough to reach the standard that you have to reach to justify suppression. We don't have all the facts. What we're trying to show to Your Honor was there's a lot to be concerned about with this particular search. This is not your ordinary foreign search. And the fact that you've got Belizean court activity that is questioning the validity of the search; the fact that you've got some facts about the nature in which it was conducted, it's very unusual. There's no other case I have seen where the thing we're fighting about, the nature of the search we're fighting about is Belize takes all, you know, the foreign country takes all the documents out of one location, literally all of them, moves them to another location and then invites the U.S. agents down to come and do a search for two weeks. That's a higher degree of U.S. involvement than in any of the other cases we've talked about as it relates to the search itself. And, again, that's not all the facts. have all the facts. They have some of the facts and Belize has some of the facts. I don't have any of the facts, but that's my point of my motion is we're entitled to them.

I think that's mostly what I want to say. I'm sure Jackie will say something that will cause me to have a

heart attack but.

THE COURT: Ms. Kasulis.

MR. KASOURAS: Judge, may I just very, very briefly. There's just one thing that I wanted to add to that argument in response to the motion since it is a joint motion.

On the question of the government's assertions and whether or not the Court should hold a hearing or simply say it's so because they say it's so. Oftentimes, there are things that perhaps prosecutors may think they know, but the development of facts at a hearing may indicate otherwise. One of the things that troubled us, we are trying to garner facts from whatever extraneous sources we can get them from. And as we indicated in our motion on page 32 and in Exhibit 9, one thing that we were able to do was to obtain certain proceedings and transcripts and statements made by Belizean courts. And as the Court knows, there was the litigation concerning the financial unit going after the funds and going after the accounts.

To put it mildly, the court, which ultimately lifted the restraints, was very concerned about the manner of the searches. And the responses by the Belizean authorities also buttressed our claim of significant United States involvement that perhaps these prosecutors may not know. For example, on page 32 we quote that the FIU -- the

records -- Exhibit 9 indicates the FIU thereafter conducted investigations and collaborated with unnamed foreign competent authorities.

And later when questioned by the court which was, again, very upset with the manner in which the investigation had proceeded, the FIU's new director stated, and I quote, no, it wasn't a bungle because it wasn't a Belize case. It was a U.S. case, and the American government was very clear as to their request. They were very clear in respect to that end. And to the extent, that is, request, then that is as far as we go, essentially is stating, and I forget what the analogy was, it may have been before my time. But essentially what the Belizean response, and, actually, we're probably the same age, what the Belizean response was to the Court's criticism, this wasn't our case. We were simply doing as we were told and requested by the United States government which was calling the shots.

And so, again, this is yet another indication of very significant and rather clear United States involvement. So these are facts that we've been able to glean from elsewhere that do seemingly indicate something contrary to the government's position.

I otherwise adopt my colleague's arguments.

THE COURT: Ms. Kasulis.

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, it's clear that Your

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Honor understands the government's positions as set forth in its papers. There are a couple of issues that I do want to address. The first is the issue of the government not making the request to Belize to get the search warrant documents. As we noted, it's not typical in MLAT requests to get those documents.

We have been in pretty much constant contact with the Office of International Affairs who does take this case very seriously and understands all of the issues and concerns.

And as set forth in the Lee case, the Second Circuit case from 2013, there was some language in that case about the prosecutors having made a good-faith effort to get the underlying documents. And in that case it was regarding the wiretaps that had been authorized in Jamaica where the defendant had been intercepted on those wiretaps. And when we went ahead and looked at the underlying facts and circumstances regarding the good-faith effort that the prosecutors made. What had happened there was the prosecutor said exactly what we did in this case, which was they consulted and conferred with OIA. They had asked OIA if it would be appropriate to make such a request to Jamaica, and OIA said the same thing that OIA said here which is it's not within the bounds of the MLAT. There is the letters rogatory and we have -- OIA meaning, has

significant concerns about such a request having an adverse impact on its relationship with Jamaica which at the time was strained.

There are similar facts and circumstances that apply here. OIA is best suited and positioned to understand the implications of making such requests on a relationship with a foreign separate sovereign government. There is no bulldog terrier relationship here, Your Honor. I think Your Honor rightly noted that Belize clearly is an independent actor. We've made requests of Belize that they have either ignored, not responded to or have done what they've wanted to. So the MLAT was merely an ask to execute searches following Mr. Bandfield's arrest. We asked for them to be expedited for obvious reasons. Bandfield's arrest was public at that time. And the first we even learned that the searches were being executed was through news reports.

So, you know, this idea that there was all of this collaboration and documentation regarding our involvement in the searches is simply not true because there is no such documentation or collaboration that is documented therein.

This really does turn on whether or not there's an agency relationship between the U.S. and Belize in this case. And the government has set forth in its papers that facts that show that there are -- there was no such agency relationship, you know. I spent a lot of time, Your Honor,

speaking with the agents who are involved in this case, consulting with the U.S. Embassy, consulting with the Office of International Affairs. The Office of International Affairs has reviewed our materials for accuracy. We have taken every allegation of U.S. involvement very, very seriously and have tracked those allegations down to their end.

The U.S. Embassy has consulted with every U.S. law enforcement member who was in Belize at the time of the search, and they have all affirmed that they were not involved in the obtaining of the search warrants, nor were they involved in the execution of the searches.

So it's the government's position, Your Honor, that a hearing is not necessary. If Your Honor thinks otherwise, we are happy to provide witnesses to attest to what the government has set forth in its papers. But I can represent that we have not taken this issue lightly; that we have satisfied our requirements pursuant to Rule 16 and what the law calls for. And the bottom line is that the facts of this case do not come close to an agency relationship. And if that's the case, the law is clear that we're in a shock to the conscience category. And as the defendants have conceded, we're not even close. Even taking what Andrew Godfried said on its face is true, we're not even close to that standard. This does not violate the norms of

international decency.

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And with respect to the government's participation in the search, the government's understanding was that Belizeans obtained a search warrant, that they executed that search warrant pursuant to their own laws. Those -- the fruits of that search was then made available to U.S. law enforcement. We were not able to take copies or -- excuse me -- not able to take the originals. Belizeans were very clear the extent to which the government could even access those materials. We were not allowed to take originals outside of Belize. And so the government's position ultimately is that the MLAT request is not -- is not relevant and, therefore, it's not triggered by Rule 16; that we don't have the search warrant materials, nor are we obligated to obtain those; and that there are no Fourth Amendment rights that have been violated or implicated here. And that putting the Fourth Amendment aside, the shock to the conscience test makes clear that this evidence is admissible.

And, separately, with respect to the inventory and, you know, how -- to what extent the Belizeans documented that search, that's really issues, Your Honor, for authenticity. It's not regarding whether these documents are ultimately admissible and whether there's some sort of violation of standards of decency or Fourth

Amendment here. So for those reasons the government believes that the Belize search results are admissible and should be admitted by the Court.

THE COURT: All right. The Rule 16 issue is very specifically defined by Rule 16. The government is obligated to produce to the defendant documents which are in the government's possession or control, documents which are significant and material to the defendant in preparing a defense, if they have it, if it's in their possession or control. Documents which the government intends to use in its case in chief should be provided to the defendant. And anything that belongs to the defendant should be provided to the defendant, if the government has it. Those are very specific. They don't require very much in the way of interpretation. The words are self-defining.

If the government does not have these documents in their possession, then your argument, Mr. Ingoglia, is very understandable. The government should make a request that raises the question as to whether the government is obligated to make a request, whether I can direct the government to make a request. But beyond that, assume the government does and the documents which you're requesting that they attempt to get would be the documents which were the basis for or the authorization for the search, which as I understand it, as I understand your argument, as I

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understand what this entire discussion is about. But assuming that my understanding is correct, and I'm aware of the fact that the notion that judges know all the law or even all the facts is very rebuttable.

But assuming that that is correct, then you are faced with a very specific legal principle that what a foreign government may have done in connection with a search or in connection with whatever the activity is which may, if it had been done by the United States be offensive, is not offensive as far as the introduction of the material which is the object of what they did, would not be excludable in a United States courtroom. So you have that problem to deal with. Even if they did get the documents and even if it is a Belize search warrant and there's something wrong with the search warrant when tested against the American requirement for search warrants, it wouldn't have effected the admissibility of the material which were obtained pursuant to that search.

MR. INGOGLIA: I have a response which is if the U.S. -- we've been talking about it as an agency relationship between the U.S. If the U.S. exercised some control, then it does matter. And --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. INGOGLIA: And what -- we have to address that question is Ms. Kasulis' -- and I take her at her word --

her investigation that she conducted to conclude, which she

2 sets forth in her brief, that there is no agency

3 relationship. And, respectfully, that's never been the

4 standard.

THE COURT: So we'll have a hearing. We'll need a hearing if that's what it is that would be required.

And the other question, of course, is an interesting one. What is the role of a United States federal court in making, if there is any at all, determinations regarding diplomatic determinations made by the government as to whether some conduct which is being requested or acquiescing in a request offends diplomatic protocol which we're not prepared to get involved with.

Is it the function of a court to say, well, you know, we're not interested in the diplomacy of the matter.

We're not interested in diplomatic protocol. We're interested in due process, fairness and all the standards of the federal court. It's an interesting issue but --

MR. INGOGLIA: Well, I think there's another alternative which is --

THE COURT: What is rogatory?

MR. INGOGLIA: Well, for sure.

And I see the U.S. Attorney's Office eagerly preparing letters rogatory. But I think you answered the question the way I would answer it, although I don't know if

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you agreed. You're asking it rhetorically.

I think that the answer is the Court's role is to make sure that what happens to Mr. Bandfield in this court before you meets with -- satisfies due process and constitutional requirements. That doesn't mean that issues of diplomatic relationships aren't important. And it might be that the U.S. Attorney's Office decides, bowing to those diplomatic concerns, that it won't seek to offer into evidence things that -- for it to use it would have to risk concerning, you know, violating a concern that's been articulated by the Office of International Affairs. That's another direction it could go, and I'm not sure that the burden -- we should reinterpret Rule 16 in a way that lets them use the evidence out of diplomatic sensitivities.

THE COURT: All right. Just let me conclude this part of the argument by this observation. I devoutly hope to believe that the government is purer than Caesar's wife.

I'm offended, really offended whenever I read or hear about government misconduct or government which does something which is impure. The object of what goes on in this courtroom or in any American courtroom is to be fair and to see that the trial which is conducted and the rights of the defendant are fully protected, and that the government should do what the government should do in the interest of fairness and justice.

It may be the government is not legally obligated to do certain things, but if the government can do it without violating some law or other protocol, the government should, if that would be the fair thing to do.

Rule 16 is very specific. It tells the government what it is the defendant is entitled to by way of discovery. And I would hope that the government complies with the spirit of Rule 16, which is to give the defendant the material they need to prepare an effective defense and to see that the trial, which they will be a party to, the prosecution of which they're the object, is completely fair, satisfy all notions of decency and fairness. That's what I devoutly hope the government will do.

And the same is true for the defendant. The government makes reciprocal requests of the defendant to turn over material which the defendant has. More often than not, that request is ignored. At least that's been my experience over the years, so it works both ways. The object here is to have a fair, fair trial which satisfies any conception of decency and a civilized concern.

Having said that, lets move on to Joint Request

Number 2 which -- now, we'll deal with whether a hearing

should be scheduled with respect to the agency issue when

we're finished, but if I for some reason overlook it, please

remind me that that's what we should be doing.

The Joint Request Number 2 is to suppress discovery produced after the discovery deadline. I really don't quite understand that request or whether it really has any merit. I mean, Rule 16 or my experience here over a number of years is that the government is obligated to produce whatever discovery material they should be producing regardless of whether there is or isn't a deadline. If material becomes available to the government after the deadline, the government -- it's a role in -- particularly in a case like this where the amount of discovery is just voluminous. It hasn't all descended into the hands of the government on one fell swoop.

So what is the -- what is the --

MR. INGOGLIA: So we don't disagree about what you just said. And, in fact, we're not seeking to exclude newly discovered evidence. So I don't -- they didn't give me dates of when they found whatever they found, but if they came into possession of some document that, you know, because they had signed up a cooperator and that cooperator gave them new documents they didn't have before, of course they couldn't have produced it. They don't have a time machine. They couldn't have produced it before. That's not what we're saying.

I'll give you the two, what we think are the most egregious examples. At the time of Mr. Bandfield's arrest

in September of 2014, roughly a year and a half ago, he had with him a laptop and a flash drive. And his wife was traveling with him and she had a laptop. Those documents -- those items were seized, and they were not -- and, look, I think what happened is they got put in a drawer and then people forgot about them. I don't think that that's an issue, but more than a year passes, they're not produced in discovery. They're -- right before the deadline, Your Honor set a deadline at a conference that we had in April for May 18th, and three days before that they decided to get a search warrant to search the contents. So up until that point they had them. There's personal stuff on there, photographs of their children, emails, communications with their family. Those were seized, but not searched.

And then they go get a search warrant and then even then there's nothing produced to the defendant. And I think most egregiously in the case of Mr. Bandfield's wife, that laptop -- there's no argument that her laptop was seized incident to arrest or anything. They just take it. They take it, they don't search it, they hold on to it. She calls and says what's going on with my laptop. They say do you consent to a search? She says no. They say, well, it's going to be a while. And they don't get a search warrant then and they wait a very long time to get -- to bother to get a search warrant. And even then they don't return it

until we file our motions. And then, according to a footnote in the brief, the government realizes that Mr. Bandfield's wife would like her property back.

And, respectfully, that's, that's crazy. Of course, she's not gifting it to the United States. Of course she wants her property back. And that's an unlawful seizure.

And, yes, the defense says we're not extremely prejudiced because, you know, we get that electronic evidence late because we don't have a trial date yet. Look, I don't know yet because I haven't studied what's on her laptop, and whether we're prejudiced or not. But this is the flip side of the coin to the argument about when one should consider employing the exclusionary rule. It's when there's conduct, not necessarily of malintent, but of malconsequence where -- that you want to deter.

And it's not okay to seize a U.S. citizen's laptop, not search it, not do anything with it, not return it for more than a year. It's just simply not okay. There's no justifiable basis for it. They don't attempt to excuse it. I don't think it was -- I don't know what happened, but I don't think anyone disagrees about broadly what the facts are. And so this is, I think, an easy one that should be suppressed. There's just no basis for doing what they did. They mishandled it. They shouldn't have

done it. What they should have said was, our bad, we're not going to use the evidence. So that's the argument on the laptop and the flash drives. Those, I think, are the most egregious examples.

There's some other discovery that comes after the deadline that the government had before the deadline, and that's the category of stuff we're objecting to. I'm not objecting to stuff they found later. That's our argument.

THE COURT: Well, let me understand your argument,
Mr. Ingoglia. First, I thought I heard you say that the
seizure was completely illegal to begin with.

Is that what you said?

MR. INGOGLIA: The seizure of -- I don't know what the basis was for the seizure of Mr. Bandfield's wife's laptop.

THE COURT: I thought I heard you say that the --having possession of it was completely unlawful to begin with which suggested that the seizure was unlawful. I assume that it's a seizure incident to arrest. I would just -- if I asked what was the basis for the seizure, that's the answer I would get otherwise I can't imagine why else the laptop was seized, why it was held for as long as it was.

MR. INGOGLIA: Well, she wasn't arrested, but Mr. Bandfield was, yes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. INGOGLIA: Go ahead. Please, I apologize.

THE COURT: Assuming that's not the basis for your suppression, the only other basis for suppressing would be if there's extreme prejudice. Or, third, just simply punish the government and say what they did was bad and we're going to punish you for being bad, and we're going to suppress it.

MR. INGOGLIA: I think that -- I mean, to be fair, I don't really disagree with your analysis.

THE COURT: Which is what you're asking me to do.

MR. INGOGLIA: Exactly right. I think that's right. Look, I think --

THE COURT: What they did was terrible, therefore, we should suppress it. All right.

Ms. Kasulis.

MS. KASULIS: I think Your Honor summed up the defendant's arguments well. There was a delay. I think we've conceded that in our papers, but we do not believe the delay was unreasonable considering -- unreasonable considering the voluminous amount of evidence in this case, Your Honor.

As you're aware, the government had been processing all of the Belize computer evidence that had been seized starting in October of 2014. We did obtain the search warrant in May. We then were able to provide a copy

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to the defendant. I believe it was -- we obtained a hard drive and then provided it in November. But there are no allegations, Your Honor, that the agent acted in bad faith or that really there was any prejudice here whatsoever, especially considering that the computer is Mr. Bandfield's own computer.

If there's any evidence for which he should know what's on the computer, it's his own computer. So we concede, Your Honor, there was a delay. There's a lot going on in this case and a lot of moving parts, but we do not believe that suppression is warranted here considering the facts and circumstances.

THE COURT: Is there anything in that -- in those laptops that the government intends to use in it's case in chief that's Rule 16 material that hasn't yet been turned over?

MS. KASULIS: It's been turned over, Your Honor.

And we actually even turned over the subset of the evidence.

So we imaged the laptop and turned it over to Mr. Bandfield right away. We then actually or the agent, of course, went through the laptop and culled the information that would be responsive to the search warrant. We then produced that culled set to Mr. Bandfield so he knew what we had deemed relevant pursuant to the search warrant or within the bounds of the search warrant. And produced only that culled set to

Mr. Mulholland to, of course, address concerns about personal information, et cetera.

Judge.

Then the rest of the computer, Your Honor, is locked by FBI CART. Our agents can't access it. It's only then the relevant -- evidence deemed relevant from the computer that the agents can now have access to.

We did produce it in Rule 16 discovery. It's unclear at this point whether or not we're going to rely on any of that evidence at trial. We're still really reviewing it and considering it with respect to the rest of our evidence, but we believe we complied with Rule 16 and the evidence shouldn't be suppressed.

THE COURT: Well, has -- is the question whether the computer should be returned? Just the thing, the computer?

MR. INGOGLIA: Well, that was a question.

THE COURT: Has that been returned?

MR. INGOGLIA: Apparently, last week they returned Mr. Bandfield's wife's computer to her.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Lets move on. I'll undoubtedly deny that motion, Mr. Ingoglia.

MR. INGOGLIA: You're less outraged than I am,

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

Now, with, with a footnote of reprimand to the

government for being dilatory, to put it mildly.

The next third joint request is the bill of particulars. The bill of particulars -- is it necessary for material? I don't have to review it. I think I've written bill of particulars motions at least a dozen or more times, and they're almost always denied, but why should this one be granted? There's no double jeopardy problem I don't believe.

MR. INGOGLIA: No. Look, they gave us some information in their response --

THE COURT: And the indictment tells you exactly what it is you're charged with. I mean, those are the basis upon which a bill of particulars would be granted.

MR. INGOGLIA: So let me give you the couple of items that I think are out of the ordinary and you'll rule on it.

One of our requests was the time period after which one of the cooperators began cooperating. And what we didn't articulate in our papers was the reason for this request. And the reason is that while Mr. Bandfield was in prison and represented by us, a person who is now a government cooperator, I believe, tried to contact him and tried to visit him in jail, and, in fact, called our office to seek our assistance in arranging for a visit.

So we asked the U.S. Attorney's Office, was he a

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cooperator then or not, because if he was a cooperator, he should -- and he's acting as an agent of the U.S. Attorney's Office, he can't be contacting the defendant. That would be a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. So we just asked that question, and they said we decline to tell you, and so that's why it's in our bill of particulars.

THE COURT: That's the only item that you're requesting in the bill of particulars?

MR. INGOGLIA: The other item is we asked for the time period, the universe of co-conspirators by time period. They've charged roughly a five-year conspiracies and the bulk of the evidence is in 2014. I'm on significant notice about who the participants are in 2014. That's when the undercover was involved. So there's wires. There's a lot of documentary evidence about communications between people.

In 2009 I got bank records and so I can't tell if their theory is this same core group that was involved in 2014 was also involved in 2009 or there's some other cast of characters that was involved in 2009 and that's why we made that request.

MR. PAES: Your Honor, if I may address the bill of particulars issue.

One I think as Your Honor pointed out, the two requests that they've made now, I don't think are the basis for a bill of particulars. Trying to find out when a

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cooperating witness started cooperating with the government, I don't see what that has got to do anything with respect to requesting a bill of particulars.

Again, similarly, with respect to when certain co-conspirators were part of the conspiracy and when they were not, again, I don't think that is part of the bill of particulars request again. With respect to what the charges are in terms of, you know, their facing, which is really what a bill of particulars is meant to do, which is to inform them about those charges, I think it was pretty clear.

And especially when it comes to Mr. Bandfield, as we stated in our papers. This isn't a situation where we have a defendant who's a minor player in a conspiracy who joins for a portion of the conspiracy, and, hence, is concerned about, well, I want to just be sure. You know, I've been charged with this five-year conspiracy period and I want to get a sense of who are they alleging I was involved with during the period that I was involved in the conspiracy.

Yeah, Mr. Bandfield, according to the government's theory, is the head of the conspiracy who was involved during the entire time period. Yes, over that time period there were certain individuals who joined in and left the conspiracy, but that is not, again, information that

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necessitates a bill of particulars in this case. And so he has no concern as to what his conduct was or as to what the allegations are with respect to the charges brought against him. And, hence, like finding out what exactly the time periods of the various co-conspirators when they came and left, if anybody knows that information better than even the government, it's Mr. Bandfield because he was the one who was operating the entire operation in Belize.

THE COURT: All right. With respect to that,
Mr. Ingoglia, I think the rules regarding bills of
particular are so clear. What you're charged with I think
is nothing that you have any doubt about. The indictment is
very clear insofar as the charges are concerned. You don't
need a bill of particulars to tell you what it is you're
charged which, which is essentially the purpose of it. The
purpose of it is also to restrict the government with
respect to evidence at some later time and, of course,
you're not really not asking for that knowing your very
professional conduct of -- your representation of your
client and effective representation of it.

And, certainly, there's no double, double jeopardy issue. It seems to me what I'm hearing all the bill of particulars material you want is really evidentiary stuff which really you're not entitled to. So that's denied.

The next joint request is to strike surplusage

from the indictment. I think I've written about that on a number of occasions in the past, probably in Gotti and a couple of others where they sought to strike snitches and rats and all of that stuff in organized crime indictments.

Now, you want to strike what, nominees?

MR. INGOGLIA: Look, I think the particular quote that most aroused my ire was that certain words had a meaning in the quote "securities fraud context." I can't imagine that there will be admissible testimony at trial concerning definitions of terms in the securities fraud context. Not -- we're not talking about the securities context, you know, because I'm sure there will be plenty of testimony about that, what do these words mean. To educate the jury a little bit, I think that's fine. But the securities fraud context, to me, it's inherently pejorative. It's speculative and I don't think there's going to be evidence to back it up and, yet, it's going to be in the charging instrument as written. And so I think that's the most striking example of what we sought to strike.

THE COURT: Well, I just don't have a specific language that you have in mind, but I've got the superseding indictment. If you know --

MR. INGOGLIA: I can point you --

THE COURT: It will probably be in the papers.

MR. PAES: Paragraph 17, Your Honor, I believe it

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    is.
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              THE COURT: Of the superseding indictment.
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    Paragraph 17?
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              MR. PAES:
                         Yes.
              THE COURT: The term "nominee," is that the
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    paragraph?
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              MR. PAES:
                          I believe that's --
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              THE COURT:
                          Is that the paragraph you're concerned
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    about, Mr. Ingoglia?
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              MR. INGOGLIA: I don't have it in front of me.
              Do you mind if I look over your shoulder?
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              MR. PAES: I would just --
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              THE COURT:
                          The nominee in the securities fraud
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    context refers to a person or firm.
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              MR. INGOGLIA: Yes, that's it. In the securities
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    fraud context, yes.
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              THE COURT: What it is that you're --
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              MR. INGOGLIA: My objection is to --
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              THE COURT: What is it that raises your ire?
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              MR. INGOGLIA: -- the securities fraud context as
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    if there is a securities fraud context for the term
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     "nominee." There is a term "nominee" that's frequently
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    used in the securities context.
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               I mean, look, I've never heard of such a thing,
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    you know, the securities fraud context. I don't think it
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would be admissible testimony.

THE COURT: So what you're asking is that this ought to read the term "nominee" refers to a person or firm in whose name. You just want to delete "in the securities fraud context," just that phrase, is that it?

MR. INGOGLIA: That would be acceptable to us, you know. The term "nominee" as used in this indictment.

THE COURT: Okay. Any problem with that?

MR. PAES: Your Honor, one of the things we did mention also in our response that we'll be superseding to fix a couple of things which actually were helpful and brought to the attention to us by the defense motions. We can try and clarify. The reason if you just take out -- if you modify a word right now, it would change the meaning because the government, you know, the word "nominee" is in terms of standard English language clearly means something.

THE COURT: Mr. Paes, this whole indictment is a securities fraud indictment, isn't it? So what are you adding?

If it's upsetting Mr. Ingoglia, I can take it out. Now, what's next.

MR. INGOGLIA: I was hoping that was going to be the standard on the Rule 16.

MR. PAES: We'll fix that in the superseding to make it a little bit more acceptable to Mr. Ingoglia.

46 **PROCEEDINGS** Okay. Now, with respect to -- I think 1 THE COURT: 2 I've taken care of that motion, that joint request. 3 MR. KASOURAS: Judge, we've made a separate motion 4 on surplusage and it is --THE COURT: Well, I'll get to that. I'll get to 5 6 your motions. 7 With respect to Joint Request Number 5, I think 8 that's the next one. 9 MR. PAES: 7. 10 THE COURT: It requires the government to produce 11 Brady materials immediately and Giglio material 120 days in 12 advance of trial and Jencks material. 13 As far as Jencks material is concerned, you know, 14 I have no authority to direct the government. The statute 15 tells the government when it is they have to turn over that 16 material. 17 But I think it's been the government of this 18 office, in any event, to turn Jencks material over pretty 19 much in advance, even though they're not required to. 20

As far as Brady and Giglio material is concerned --

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MR. INGOGLIA: Judge, I think that their response addressed one aspect of our Brady requests, so I think we don't have a remaining dispute on that. I think we'd like more time on the Jencks material and 3500 material than

they're offering, but I recognize that unless you feel like you wish to exert some persuasive power.

THE COURT: All right. Again, this is -- I don't want to make that speech again about fairness and so on and so forth. There's no reason in the world why it can't be turned over earlier. You're not putting a witness in jeopardy or worried about things that would be unlawful or prejudicial for somebody I don't see any reason why it's held until.

I wrote an opinion on that. I directed, because if you read Brady and you read Giglio in the Supreme Court it says upon request. And I wrote a rather long opinion in which I said the Supreme Court said turn it over upon request. And the Second Circuit didn't think upon request means upon request. So, again, the government, do what is the decent, nice thing to do.

All right. That takes care of that.

All right. Now we have Bandfield's individual requests. Request Number 1, severance from Mulholland.

MR. INGOGLIA: So the request is principally animated by speedy trial concerns. As you know,
Mr. Bandfield has been incarcerated since September of 2014 and we're ready to go as soon as Your Honor can have us.
You know, starting April 1st, if that would work. I

recognize that Mr. Mulholland joined the party late. He was

arrested, you know, a year in and hasn't had the benefit of the same amount of time. So that's what's animating the request.

In terms of the evidence against the two gentlemen, as I understand it, they're, you know, two circles that overlap in the middle, but there's a big piece of trading activity evidence that you wouldn't necessarily need to introduce against Mr. Bandfield. And there's probably a bunch of undercover testimony you wouldn't need to introduce against Mr. Mulholland. There is an overlap, but I don't think it is, given Mr. Bandfield's speedy trial concerns I think -- what I want to make sure we achieve is that he goes forward as fast as possible.

THE COURT: Do you want me to respond to that?

MR. PAES: No, Your Honor, I'm happy to.

THE COURT: Well, I will.

MR. PAES: With respect to any prejudice, I think our papers make it clear there's absolutely no prejudice to Mr. Bandfield in terms of, you know, what he describes as the evidence that would be admissible against Mr. Mulholland. In fact, the evidence admissible against Mr. Mulholland, the trading activity that he describes, is going to be admissible against Mr. Bandfield regardless because we have charged him with the securities fraud counts that we've talked about. We have charged him with

securities fraud conspiracy, because he provided the platform by which the scheme was executed. So all of that evidence is coming in anyway.

And I think we made it very clear with respect to the kind of arguments about how Mr. Mulholland is somehow a much more -- I don't want to mischaracterize it, but at least a bigger player for some reason because he made a whole lot of more money than Mr. Bandfield. We talked about it in terms of role. We look at Mr. Bandfield as being kind of the mastermind of the entire Belize operation, and Mr. Mulholland is a leader in terms of the top client that Mr. Bandfield had. So they're equally bad role players in the government's eyes. And so none of this prejudice is substantial that under case law constitute a miscarriage of justice.

So I think severance is -- if there were ever a case where severance should not be granted, I think it's this. They are so intertwined and interlinked in this case.

And with respect to speedy trial concerns, I haven't heard, you know, Mr. Kasouras say anything about it as to when, you know, he would be ready. I think the only thing we had -- Mr. Kasouras asked for so far was a one-week extension to file his motions. That's the only delay I think that has been called so far by Mr. Mulholland being added to the indictment. So I don't think that qualifies as

some kind of miscarriage of justice either in terms of a delay of speedy trial.

Whether we have a trial on April 1st as

Mr. Ingoglia wants, or if we have it on May 1st to give it
some time for Mr. Kasouras. And we also don't know what
lawyers' schedules are right now or the Court's schedule for
that matter. But the government is ready to go to trial
whenever the Court deems.

THE COURT: How long does the government contemplate this trial will take?

MS. KASULIS: Approximately a month, Your Honor. Four weeks.

THE COURT: With respect to the motion to sever, I really can't add anything, anything at all to what the Supreme Court said in Zafiro which is essentially the deciding case in all severance motions.

The parties are properly joined. If you look at Rule 8, properly joined as far as Rule 14 is concerned. So that severance on that basis really has no merit from a legal point.

And insofar as the Speedy Trial Act is concerned, I'm sure that Mr. Mulholland is much anxious to have a speedy trial as Mr. Bandfield is. And I think that judging by the motion that was made on behalf of Mr. Mulholland, I will suspect that Mr. Mulholland knows just about everything

about this case in order to go to trial and prepare an effective defense as Mr. Bandfield knows.

With respect to from a legal point of view, I think it's 3161 of Title 18, as far as speedy trial is concerned, I think specifically says that if the speedy trial clock is stopped as to one defendant, it stops as to all. That happens frequently where you have multiple-defendant cases. So I don't know if that speedy trial argument is effective.

So I made some observations, Mr. Kasouras, about your readiness to go to trial, and I would expect that you're going to be ready to go to trial expediently. I don't think that there should be very much need for a delay as far as your preparation for trial is concerned. You've had an enormous amount of material provided already.

MR. KASOURAS: That's true, Your Honor. My issue is -- well, I have a couple of issues. But my schedule will not permit a trial for -- and I'm not talking about a long time, but I'm starting a trial that is definitely going in this courthouse on February 22nd. And then I have a trial that has been scheduled in March.

I spoke to Mr. Ingoglia about this, and reasonably speaking, Judge, there's a lot of material that we have been provided, but there's also a mountain of material that we need to continue with in order to prepare for trial.

With respect to Mr. Mulholland, the documentary evidence and the complexity of the case with respect to him is far greater given the fact that he is accused of pretty much masterminding the trading of stock for over 40 companies as well as a manipulation of it. So I'm just saying this is not a case for which a tremendous amount of preparation is not in order. And I am going to be tied up for the next three months on trials that are older, that have been set and that are also somewhat complicated.

So, reasonably speaking, I spoke to Mr. Ingoglia, the very earliest I can be prepared is June 1st.

THE COURT: Well, we'll deal with that at a later time, and I'll have a conference with all parties with respect to that, and we'll fix the earliest conceivable date that we can fix to get this case moving.

MR. PAES: Can I just add one thing to what Mr. Kasouras said. With respect to the 40 pump and dumps that he referenced and the complexity of it. We have no doubt about, obviously, the complexity of the case. But I think as the government represented in its motions, you know, we will be providing by the end of this month a list of ten tickers or less that the government is going to be relying on at trial.

Two of those tickers we've already identified as being the two substantive counts, which is CYNK and VLNX.

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And those two tickers are the main substantive counts that they were aware of when the indictment was returned. So -- and we will further reduce the additional tickers that we would include as part of the conspiracy count to, you know, eight or less than that. So it's going to be a much more narrow case than, you know, I think Mr. Mulholland is concerned about at this time.

THE COURT: All right. As I've indicated, I intend to have another conference before long to see if we can't fix the speediest trial date or that would accommodate all the issues that may be involved.

Now, I understand there's another superseding indictment.

MR. PAES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, is that going to be superseding anything that's substantive that would prevent?

MR. PAES: The only substantive change to it would be the addition of Mr. Mulholland to the tax fraud conspiracy count which Mr. Mulholland actually already addressed and tried to counter in his papers. So we're going to fix that.

The only other change, again, changes which are not significant or not substantive, is the change in the date range for one of the charges as I believe Mr. Ingoglia pointed out. There was some inconsistency between the

conspiracy range and the money laundering range. And since they're tied, we will fix that.

And the third thing, again, which was pointed out, was the definition of corrupt clients in the indictment which indicated them to be U.S. clients only. And we will kind of fix that to include both U.S. and non-U.S. clients. So other than the addition of Mr. Mulholland to the tax fraud conspiracy, most of the other changes are, you know, more ministerial.

THE COURT: When do you contemplate having -MR. PAES: We've actually scheduled -- I'm sorry,

Jackie, do you want to address that?

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MS. KASULIS: We requested grand jury time, Your Honor, I believe it was February 12th. So in the very near future.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, the next motions are Mr. Mulholland's individual motions. And Mr. Mulholland seeks to suppress wiretap evidence from March and April.

Mr. Kasouras, do you want to address that?

MR. KASOURAS: Yes. Thank you very much, Judge.

Judge, initially when I first came aboard and I heard about a wiretap and I heard about Belize and I heard about extraterritorial involvement by defendants, I didn't

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expect to have much of a wiretap motion. But in reading all of the materials that we have been provided with, it has struck me that even in a case involving other countries, that the government in this case has supplanted the requirement of necessity with a different standard that I would refer to as wouldn't it be nice. And wouldn't it add to our case.

With respect to necessity, Judge, it is seldom that I am able to discern such easy and complete infiltration by the United States government into an organization, albeit one that's out of the country.

In this case, from the very beginning I have really not in quite some time seen anything easier.

Starting in November of 2012 there's an initial contact with a Kevin Leach with an undercover and what follows is basically an invitation into this organization.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Would you just help me by identifying what it is that you find egregious or warrants suppressing the wiretap evidence. Is there something about the wiretap application? Is there something deficient about what it is that the agent said was the necessity for the wiretap? Was there a question of whether he exhausted ordinary, normal investigative techniques or normal procedures? What is it that you're complaining about?

MR. KASOURAS: It's all of it. The necessity

requirement, in our view, is not satisfied.

Judge, you had undercover infiltration into this organization, contact with several people, meetings in Belize during which the government describes statements by Mr. Bandfield and other people basically explaining what the government believes is this scheme from the beginning to end. You have a confidential informant. There's surveillance, videotape, audio tape. There are subpoenas that were executed. There are interviews that were conducted. There were toll records that were obtained. There were telephone toll analyses, email search warrants and financial investigations, that basically, according to this affidavit.

Now, we do make a Franks' motion later, and I'll explain that, but the necessity requirement here is not satisfied. There was no necessity for a wiretap. They had the financial institutions. They had 23 email addresses which yielded tremendous results. They identify all of the people if -- well, most, if not all, of the people in those accounts. They had Pay Pal records which clearly demonstrated how the money was moved into the accounts in Belize, out of the accounts in Belize, from whom they were moved, who owned the accounts.

And then, again, you had meetings in Belize, invitations to come back, invitations to dinner to basically

meet the people the government deems to be the co-conspirators. They had the names of the accounts, they had all of the transactions. And then combined with that, they had admissions on video and audio of the transactions.

And the undercover actually became a client, went to them and said, I'd like to open an account, I'd like to not pay taxes, I'd like to avoid American regulatory authority. And was then, in detail, in detail explained, okay, this is how we do it, this is the way we're going to do it and then they did it. They had the names of financial institutions.

So in terms of necessity, this wiretap was nothing more than to supplement a case. When the affidavit -- when the affiant in the affidavit explains that surveillance wouldn't have worked. Well, Your Honor, surveillance wouldn't have worked if the company was located across the street from the courthouse. You can't just sit on a financial office and see what happens. The point is, every single investigative technique that we know of was utilized with, with great success.

And I guess the way I would put it to you is if you take the wiretap and the evidence gleaned from the wiretap out of this case, you wouldn't have the same indictment. You would have the same evidence except for these additional and what we would submit are, in this case,

gratuitous conversations that were simply not necessary.

Now, with respect to the affidavit and the standard for misstatements and omissions, what I'll say is this: The affidavit simply does not describe the resounding success that all of these investigative techniques that were utilized demonstrate. And so one is left to wonder if the issuing magistrate had a recitation of this investigation and all of the results from it, then a question becomes whether the issuing magistrate would have determined that necessity was demonstrated.

With respect to one specific item that we do alert the Court to, is there's an inconsistency in an affidavit that was submitted in support of a search warrant, I believe, for something belonging to Mr. Bandfield in which the agent very specifically states just how successful the email investigation was in identifying the IPC clients. And then in the affidavit in support of the wiretap, that's downplayed and it's stated that the email, the emails that were, were a product of the search warrant were not successful in identifying the IPC clients.

The fact of the matter is, Your Honor, the investigative techniques, the old stuff, the traditional stuff that they've been using, you know, for decades and decades, worked in this case really without a glitch. You had no counter surveillance. You had no countermeasures

taken by any of the individuals. These people were, according to this affiant, ready and willing to talk and to conduct business in very, very specific means. Wiretaps reveal the words spoken by particular individuals. And I understand that that's important when it's necessary.

Your Honor, all of the individuals here were recorded in Belize and videotaped. There are consensuals. They have conversations. So that is the crux of our motion, that necessity was not established and that the affidavit did not adequately apprise the issuing magistrate of the success of investigative techniques. And at least, in one instance, misrepresented the success of the emails that were procured through search warrants.

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, the idea that the wiretaps could not provide any sort of additional evidence in this case is just simply not true. Certain kinds of evidence, obviously, yield different kinds of results.

In this case Mr. Bandfield had a very voluminoius set of clients. The only way in which the government was able to understand the nature and scope and the identities of those clients was to use different investigative tools. One of them was to use the undercover agent.

As set forth in the recordings that the undercover agent made, Mr. Bandfield referred to other clients but didn't name those other clients. He didn't hand our

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undercover agent, for example, a full client list. And it's clear that some of the clients, for example, used email; others did not. In fact, Mr. Bandfield cautioned our undercover agent really to refrain from using email as much as possible. There are certain kinds of information that the government was only able to obtain, for example, through wiretaps.

For example, the clients directing trading of various stocks through their brokerage accounts, that, most of the time happened, I would say the majority of the time happened via the telephone. So there's whole kinds of information that the government would -- did not have wiretap capability, we would not have been able to obtain.

And we want to refute what Mr. Mulholland is saying with respect to that our indictment would look exactly the same. If you look at the indictment itself, for example, there's a stock, Cana, C-a-n-a, in which we actually set forth the trades that were directed by one of the corrupt clients of that stock to manipulate that stock. The way in which we were able to set forth that evidence was through wiretaps.

And that's just one example, Your Honor, of the way in which we intend to use the wiretap evidence at trial and why it was very critical in this case. There's no accusation here that all of these different investigative

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techniques were not made clear to the Court. We were very clear of what had been successful, but why the wiretaps were very critical in this case, and they absolutely were.

With respect to this inconsistency, I believe there's no inconsistency, Your Honor, about the email search warrants -- sorry, the search warrant for Mr. Bandfield's computer. The agent did explain how the email search warrants had been very helpful to help us identify some of the clients that were involved in this case. But that doesn't mean that the wiretap evidence was not incredibly helpful and necessary to help us round out the full scope of who those clients were.

And, additionally, with respect to, you know, the fact that the undercover agent was actually in Belize and was able to access all of these co-conspirators that were in Belize. For example, Mr. Mulholland wasn't even in Belize during the time period that the undercover agent was there. What we were able to do was capture Mr. Mulholland calling in to IPC and giving direction and talking with his co-conspirators about, for example, acquiring IBCs. He used an alias. We were able to capture his voice. So that's, obviously, critical evidence that we wouldn't have had without the wiretaps.

So for those reasons. There were no misrepresentations, Your Honor. We were very clear about

what the wiretaps meant for our investigation, what else we had done to investigate the case. And so the idea that there was no necessity here is just simply not true.

THE COURT: All right. I'll reserve on that. I'll deal with that.

The next individual request is the government is requested to provide 404(b) evidence 60 days before trial.

Do you want to respond to that?

MR. KASOURAS: If I can just say, the reason -- I understand what the normal practice is in the courthouse, Judge, and it really depends, my request does depend on what the 404(b) evidence is. And I think what Your Honor's response may be is that they just need to do what's right here. All I'm saying is that since Mr. Mulholland is not in the United States, if the 404(b) material here consists of, you know, things that happened in other countries, that it would be very difficult and time consuming for us to investigate, that the sooner they give it to us the better, because it's a lot harder for us to be able to deal with it if that's the case.

MR. PAES: Your Honor, in response we, obviously, mention that we would provide any 404(b) one month prior to trial. I can tell the Court right now, as we stand here today, it's not that we are sitting on any 404(b) material, you know, that we are not providing to the defense. So we

don't have any 404(b) material in our possession at this time.

To the extent we get it and we can produce it, you know, a little bit sooner, we'll be happy to do that, but we also don't want to be precluded as we think the defense motions are trying to do with having us provide this.

Setting kind of a deadline by which we're going to bind with them and then say, well, you can't do it if you find it after that fact.

THE COURT: All right. That motion is a motion that I can't grant. I'm, obviously, not going to direct the government to be tied to any specific date, even if I had authority to do it. They'll provide the 404(b) fully in enough time to permit the government to prepare its defense. I can't imagine -- just my overall sense of this case, the indictment, what 404(b) evidence is going to be available to me in terms of bad acts under 404(b).

In any event, turn it over as soon as you get it.

There's no reason why you have to hold on to it. The notice of expert testimony, I think the law requires that. So Mr. -- that motion is a motion which is a motion that I don't have to deal with. I'd better say it's denied for reasons that I don't have to deal with it. The law requires that you do it.

Permission to file additional motions in limine.

64 **PROCEEDINGS** Yes, you have permission to file a notice in limine. 1 2 Hopefully, you'll do it in enough time to permit the 3 government to respond to it. 4 MR. KASOURAS: We will try, Judge. We have two other --5 6 If there's nothing else, I think that THE COURT: 7 the only motion that I really have to deal with is the Rule 8 16 motion which is the only significant. 9 MR. KASOURAS: Judge, we have two motions that we 10 have not addressed. 11 THE COURT: Which ones? 12 MR. KASOURAS: Well, our motion with respect to 13 surplusage is a little bit different and I think that, if 14 anything, it just simply need to be clarified in the 15 indictment. 16 Our singular motion with respect to surplusage has 17 to do with the language in the indictment relating to FATCA. 18 THE COURT: Relating to what? 19 MR. KASOURAS: F-a-t-c-a. And it's in paragraph 14 of the superseding indictment. And essentially FATCA is 20 21 a federal law that was enacted in 2010 that the government 22 states that targeted tax noncompliance by U.S. taxpayers 23 with foreign financial accounts in offshore assets. We

don't quarrel with that, with that fact, because it was

enacted in 2010. But as we set forth in our motion, it

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actually came into effect on a rolling basis, and so our simple point is the indictment gives the impression that FATCA was enacted and in effect, and, therefore, there to be violated throughout the entire period of the conspiracy whereas that's just not the case.

So while we understand the reference to FATCA in the indictment, we do believe that the way it is referred to in the indictment is misleading. And we, we set forth on page 44 of our motion, Judge, how it basically, on a rolling basis, certain parts of it were expanded and came -- and even though it was in effect in 2010, was not being enforced in full form. And in many ways, ways that do effect the charges in this case.

THE COURT: Let me see if I understand what it is that you've said. You said that the paragraph 14 is misleading in some respect.

MR. KASOURAS: It's misleading in that it states that the FATCA was enacted in 2010 and, therefore, gives the impression that it was in effect and being enforced in the years thereafter, which include the entire period charged in this conspiracy. In fact, even though it was enacted in 2010, it was not being enforced. And there were specific memoranda by the government as to its non-enforcement.

So all I'm asking is that the government clarify in the indictment that it was enacted in 2010, but was not

in effect until I believe it's 2000 and -- starting in 2012 and then it was expanded in 2013.

THE COURT: Did the statute, when it was enacted, explicitly provide, the legislation explicitly provide that this statute, this law becomes effective on a particular date?

MR. KASOURAS: It did, but then there was a memorandum issued that it was not going to be enforced.

MR. PAES: Your Honor, may I respond?

If I may.

MR. KASOURAS: Sure.

MR. PAES: Your Honor, first of all, the paragraph is accurate in what it states. Additionally, first of all, it doesn't meet the standard for surplusage, but that's besides the point. And just in terms of its accuracy, it is accurate.

What Mr. Kasouras is alluding to is that because it was a new statute, the government didn't start enforcing it to give individuals, businesses time to get in compliance with the statute. But, obviously, the law is on the books.

And, importantly, we charged conspiracy count over here. And, clearly, what this whole operation was set up for and which Mr. Bandfield also explains in the video referencing, you know, at parts FATCA by him and his co-conspirators is an attempt and kind of a scheme that's

designed to evade FATCA now that it's on the books.

The fact that it was being enforced, if we had a substantive tax fraud count, that -- it would -- may be relevant at that point in time because then you're saying, well, it wasn't being enforced so we had time to comply with it. And you are charging him for the entire time period with tax fraud violation.

The charges are conspiracy, which is an agreement to violate a law, which is on the books and whether it's enforced or not, that's still a crime.

THE COURT: That's a remarkable argument that there's a statute that says that something is unlawful, but because it's not being enforced, you can violate the statute and do what is unlawful. I mean, if I understand what you're saying, that's essentially what you're saying to me.

MR. KASOURAS: I'm saying it only because the government issued a memorandum publicly stating that it would not be enforced.

THE COURT: Is that a fact?

MR. PAES: Your Honor, the government has stated at various times that this is now going to be in effect. There were certain parts that went into effect in 2012, some in 2013, and there may have even been a part that went into effect in 2014.

MR. KASOURAS: Right.

MR. PAES: Regarding, you know, individuals, business, whether they were U.S. based or based outside the United States.

The issue though for the indictment and what Mr. Kasouras is asking is to strike something in the indictment as surplusage is that, one, accurate; two, doesn't effect the charge in any way because it's a conspiracy count and the fact that they were not enforcing it until later, is, you know, is not relevant with respect to the conspiracy count. The law was on the books and the government gave individuals and businesses time by which to become compliant with the law. But it was still on the books and enacted in 2010.

THE COURT: All right. Your motion is denied. What else, Mr. Kasouras?

MR. KASOURAS: Judge, with respect to the privilege issue, there were documents that were provided to prior counsel and the government has set forth in their motion --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KASOURAS: -- how they discerned what was privileged and what was not privileged. And here's our problem. Contrary to or different from the normal procedure of what we normally have where the government, for example, will execute a search warrant, they'll come into possession

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of documents that may be privileged. And then what happens is after the person is arrested, there's usually a discussion between both sides as to what is privileged, what is not privileged, with the defense being given an opportunity prior to that decision being made to voice an opinion as to whether certain documents are privileged. And oftentimes the Court may look at things in camera to make a determination.

What we had here was the cooperating witness in this case, the main cooperating witness, was an attorney who represented various entities in this case for which the government concedes there was an attorney or could have been an attorney/client privilege. This individual, after he begins cooperating, and I would submit we'd all agree may have an agenda, motivated in some ways, provides these documents to the government. And then the government on page 80 of their response indicates the four criteria that they used in determining what was privileged and what was not privileged. One of them would be that the document contained communications between the cooperating witness and an individual who was not the witness' client. That's fine. But then we have the document contained communications between the cooperating witness and a client, but the presence of a third party on the communication broke the privilege. It's things like this that concern us.

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And all we're asking for is for the government to provide us with, with respect to the documents that they decided are not privileged, what criteria is attached to each one. My client will then be able to discern if they were communications between him and the government. For example, whether or not there was or was not a third party present. And he'd be able to articulate a response or a challenge to the conclusions by the government, which is precipitated and fueled, in large part, by a lawyer who's now a cooperating witness seeking to carry favor with the government, a smart guy, by the way, who presumably knows what the privilege is and knows how to pierce it.

So the only way that we can really decide whether the government has made an accurate determination as to whether these things are privileged is to know which of these four criteria attached to them. My sense is that in making its determination, the government certainly would have made notations with respect to the documents which are all Bates numbered as to why they're not privileged.

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, there's not one document that Mr. Kasouras has pointed to thus far where he says the document was improperly provided to the prosecution. It seems to make more sense here is that there are documents that Mr. Kasouras disputes should have been in the hands of the prosecution after the firewall process was undertaken.

Angela Grant, RPR, CRR Official Court Reporter We can certainly address that with him. But to go through every single document to have to show what basis or what combination of bases the firewall team who undertook an extensive review of these documents seems very inefficient considering the amount of evidence and discovery in this case.

We are happy to address any concerns that Mr. Kasouras has about specific documents that went through the firewall process were deemed not privileged and provided to the prosecution. He's not done so up until this point, and if he chooses to do that, we're happy to address his concerns.

MR. KASOURAS: Judge, there are over a thousand documents that I can tell you most of which look privileged. If the -- if the reason they're not privileged is because some third party was there, I can't look at the document and discern that. If they have an index where they can tell us --

THE COURT: Well, excuse me. You say most of which look privileged.

MR. KASOURAS: Right.

THE COURT: Why don't you tell the government what documents you believe you think are privileged. And let the government respond to it.

MR. KASOURAS: Okay.

THE COURT: Instead of simply assuming that what the government did is improper, incomplete. Improper in the sense that the firewall didn't -- when the firewall says there was a third party present there and, therefore, it's not privileged, you don't believe it.

MR. KASOURAS: I don't imply any impropriety by the government. I'm saying the information came from a cooperating witness given to the government. How are they to discern whether he's telling the truth or not?

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor --

MR. KASOURAS: It's not the government that's making the decision. They're making a decision and it's novel because they're making it based on information from a cooperating witness as opposed to just an independent analysis as to whether it's privileged. That's all I'm saying.

THE COURT: Why don't you point out to the government what documents you think the government -- the cooperating witness may be disseminating about.

MR. PAES: One other thing, Your Honor. I think
Mr. Kasouras may also want to consider in that analysis,
which might save him some time. Obviously, the crime fraud
exception has been implicated here by the fact that the
lawyer and the client have been charged in this case. So
that might actually help get us done faster.

THE COURT: That's a rather interesting argument you're making. The government should determine whether the cooperator is telling the truth. I suppose if the government has any suspicion that the cooperator is not telling the truth, he wouldn't for very long have a cooperation agreement. I think you've been through that on more than one occasion.

Is there anything else? Nothing.

MR. INGOGLIA: No, Your Honor.

MS. KASULIS: No. Your Honor.

THE COURT: So all I really have is the Rule 16 issue, essentially. And as soon as the superseding indictment is handed down, I'll have the parties come in and see if we can fix a firm trial date. Get this case started without undue delay, unnecessary delay.

And you'll have to be concerned about your own trial schedule with respect to that, Mr. Kasouras.

All right. Anything else?

MS. KASULIS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure to have you all here.

MS. KASULIS: Thank you, Judge.

MR. INGOGLIA: Thank you.

THE COURT: There was something I was supposed to ask you about, whether we need a hearing on the agency

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1	issue, right?
2	MR. PAES: Oh, yes.
3	THE COURT: I asked you to remind me.
4	MR. INGOGLIA: The question of the hearing.
5	THE COURT: We need a hearing on that agency
6	issue.
7	MR. INGOGLIA: That's right. And we didn't remind
8	you.
9	THE COURT: All right. Do you want that? Do you
10	think that's necessary?
11	MR. INGOGLIA: I think so, Judge.
12	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine if you think it is.
13	It's like in the nature of kind of a Fatico hearing. So why
14	don't we fix a date for that.
15	When can you have your witnesses available?
16	MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, if we could just have a
17	quick moment. We just want to talk about the nature of the
18	hearing. Excuse me.
19	THE COURT: Sure. Sure.
20	(Brief pause.)
21	COURTROOM DEPUTY: March 29th, that's Tuesday, at
22	10:00 a.m.
23	MR. PAES: Okay.
24	MR. INGOGLIA: Done.
25	MS. KASULIS: Okay.

PROCEEDINGS 75 THE COURT: March 29th at what time? 1 2 COURTROOM DEPUTY: 10 o'clock. 3 MR. SAPONE: Did you say 10:00 a.m.? 4 COURTROOM DEPUTY: 10:00 a.m. THE COURT: When we said that the only thing that 5 6 I think I have to deal with was the Rule 16, let me just 7 I'm not sure -- I don't think you're clarify something. 8 making a Franks' motion, Mr. Kasouras. Your contemplation 9 of a Franks' motion was based upon what you perceive to be 10 some inconsistency in two affidavits. 11 If my recollection of Franks v. Delaware is still 12 accurate, I think the question would be whether assuming 13 those two so-called inconsistencies or those two items were 14 not in the affidavit, would the affidavit still be enough to justify the issuance of a warrant? Or would they be so 15 16 material that if they, in fact, were inconsistent the 17 magistrate wouldn't have issued the warrant. 18 suspect that even if there is some slight inconsistency, it 19 probably would not have effected the determination whether 20 there was enough probable cause to --21 MR. KASOURAS: I don't make those motions lightly. 22 The reason that I put it in was under Rajamatari 23 (phonetic) --24 It's part of your necessity argument. THE COURT: 25 MR. KASOURAS: Right.

PROCEEDINGS 76 1 THE COURT: So I still remember Franks v. 2 Delaware, at least in part. 3 MR. KASOURAS: Judge, there's not a lot you don't 4 remember. Is there anything else? 5 THE COURT: 6 MR. INGOGLIA: No, Judge. 7 MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, obviously, the motions 8 are pending so time would be excluded. Right. Right. That's correct. 9 THE COURT: 10 MS. KASULIS: Until the hearing date? THE COURT: Aside from which I think it's an 11 12 understatement to say this is a complex case, which is also 13 a basis for excluding time, but the fact that motions are 14 pending. Although, I think the Speedy Trial Act also in the cases say that there was a period of time within which 15 16 motions can't be pending forever have to be disposed of at some point. 17 18 In any event, thank you very much. Time is excluded until March 29th and we'll deal with a further 19 20 exclusion then. 21 Thank you. 22 MS. KASULIS: Thank you, Judge. 23 MR. INGOGLIA: Thank you, Your Honor. 24

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